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Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause: The 
Supreme Court as Catalyst for Spurring Legislative 
Gridlock in State Income Tax Reform 
“[T]hese determinations must continue to be made by the courts, unless the 
national interests are to be sacrificed until the heavy machinery of Congress can 
be set in motion.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The past few decades have witnessed courts, Congress, and 
commentators struggle to define the reach of a state’s taxing power 
over corporations’ interstate income. During this same period, e-
commerce has expanded at exponential rates, followed closely by a 
concomitant increase in attempts by states to tax out-of-state 
corporations doing business in their jurisdictions. Over thirty years 
ago, the Supreme Court in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady2 laid out a 
four-part test to evaluate the constitutionality of state taxes 
burdening out-of-state interests: (1) whether the activity taxed has a 
substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2) whether the tax is fairly 
apportioned to the taxing jurisdiction; (3) whether the tax 
discriminates against interstate commerce; and (4) whether the tax 
is fairly related to the services the state provides the taxpayer.3 
Though this framework seems facially straightforward, its 
application in practice is quite challenging. A simple example will 
suffice to highlight the test’s practical complexity. 
Suppose that Corporation X, physically located in California, 
provides an online service exclusively to customers in New York and 
California, and derives 80% of its revenue from New York customers 
and 20% of its revenue from California customers. Which state 
should be able to tax Corporation X’s revenue—California, New 
York, or both? Each state will undoubtedly wish to lay a claim on as 
much of Corporation X’s income as possible, but, obviously, both 
states will not be free to tax all of Corporation X’s income because 
 
 1. Samuel Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed 
“Human Life” Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333, 389 n.176 (1982). 
 2. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 3. Id. at 279. 
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such double taxation would violate the second prong of the Complete 
Auto test requiring fair apportionment. Perhaps California should 
have the exclusive power to tax 100% of Corporation X’s income 
because Corporation X has an exclusive physical nexus with 
California. After all, Corporation X derives the lion’s share of its 
benefits from the public amenities provided by California’s tax 
dollars, such as roads, schools, and law enforcement. 
But New York also provides valuable benefits to Corporation X. 
Indeed, New York’s customer base is uniquely attuned to 
Corporation X’s service offering. If not for New York’s stable 
economy, infrastructure, and public education, delivered through its 
tax dollars, Corporation X’s New York customers would not be in a 
position to purchase Corporation X’s services. While Corporation X 
does not have a physical nexus with New York as it does with 
California, it could still be said to have a substantial “economic 
nexus” with New York, evidenced by the fact that it is from New 
York that Corporation X derives the majority of its revenue. Should 
New York be allowed to ask Corporation X for a return on the 
benefits it provides to Corporation X, even though an “economic 
nexus” with New York is less direct—and arguably less substantial—
than California’s nexus measured by actual physical presence within 
its jurisdictional boundaries? 
Whether so-called “economic nexus” is sufficient to establish a 
“substantial nexus” under Complete Auto is a matter of heated debate. 
Another contested issue revolves around Complete Auto’s second 
prong—fair apportionment. Given that both states provide certain 
unquantifiable benefits to Corporation X, scholars debate how best 
to achieve a “fair” apportionment of corporate income among states 
so as to achieve a tax that is fairly related to state-provided benefits. 
The Supreme Court has refused to establish a single “fair” 
apportionment practice or formula for fear of treading on states’ 
rights, preferring instead to resolve fairness disputes on a case-by-
case basis.4 But the absence of a single apportionment formula 
applicable to all states has created a patchwork of state-by-state 
apportionment formulae that often subjects multi-state corporations 
to combined state taxation on more than 100% of their income. And 
corporations are not the only ones that suffer from this currently 
 
 4. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978); Container Corp. of Am. 
v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 171 (1983). 
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fragmented system. States also suffer from lack of uniform standards 
because multi-state corporations have learned that they must play 
the federal and state governments against each other to minimize 
their state tax liability and avoid taxation on more than 100 percent 
of their income.5 Consequently, many state coffers already suffering 
from the recent economic downturn are being further depleted.6 
To reform the current mishmash of inconsistent state policies 
regarding the taxation of multi-state corporate income, some have 
proposed federal statutory solutions that would modernize the 
system and impose uniform taxing standards upon the states.7 
Indeed, some proponents of this solution posit that only Congress 
can repair the broken system, restore predictability and 
administrative fairness to taxpayers, and ensure a more stable and 
equitable revenue stream to the states.8 Though these federal 
statutory solutions are theoretically sound, their practical value 
hinges entirely on their ability to emerge from legislative committee 
and enter the statute books. Congress’s track record on state income 
tax legislation, however, suggests that adoption of this (or any) 
solution is unlikely. To date, congressional committees have 
proposed several bills aimed at streamlining the state income tax 
system, but all have died in committee.9 This political stalemate 
highlights one major difficulty of implementing a proper solution to 
the current debacle. 
The Supreme Court has only compounded the problem by 
repeatedly refusing to offer constitutional guidance on the 
appropriate reach of state taxing power. The Court has instead 
 
 5. See, e.g., Gary Cornia et al., The Disappearing State Corporate Income Tax, 58 NAT’L TAX J. 
115, 136 (2005). 
 6. Taxpayer pursuit of rent-seeking and tax planning opportunities is an influential 
factor in the significant decline of state tax revenue over the past three decades. See id. 
 7. See, e.g., Quinn T. Ryan, Beyond BATSA: Getting Serious About State Corporate Tax 
Reform, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275, 307–14 (2010); Adam B. Thimmesch, The Illusory Promise of 
Economic Nexus, 13 Fla. Tax Rev. 157, 211 (2012). 
 8. Ryan, supra note 7, at 326; David M. Hudson Daniel, International and Interstate 
Approaches to Taxing Business Income, 6 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 562, 614 (1984) (“Interstate 
uniformity can only be achieved by Congressional action.”). 
 9. E.g., Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2009, H.R. 1083, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2011, H.R. 1439, 112th Cong. (2011); 
Business Activity Tax Simplification Act of 2013, H.R. 2992, 113th Cong. (2013); New Economy 
Tax Fairness Act, S.2401, 106th Cong. (2000); Comprehensive Tax Restructuring and 
Simplification Act of 1994, S.2160 (1994); see also Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Difficulty of Getting 
Serious About State Corporate Tax Reform, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 327 (2010). 
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chosen to defer to Congress out of ostensible respect for the 
separation of powers doctrine. Yet without an external catalyst to 
propel a viable solution through legislative gridlock, these prior bills’ 
burials in the legislative graveyard will continue to foreshadow a 
similar fate for future statutory proposals. This Comment argues 
that the Supreme Court should fill this catalytic role—and can do so 
constitutionally—by acting pursuant to its dormant commerce 
power. Doing so will allow the Court to correct longstanding 
problems with the state corporate income tax system that have 
plagued both states and taxpayers for several decades. 
A Supreme Court ruling in this area is constitutionally 
permissible despite the fact that interstate taxation heavily involves 
questions of interstate commerce—an area constitutionally assigned 
to Congress. Although the Constitution has granted Congress the 
final say on laws touching interstate commerce, the Supreme Court 
is free (until Congress acts) to utilize the dormant Commerce Clause 
to prevent states from unduly burdening interstate commerce.10 The 
Court’s invocation of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is 
valuable because such decisions provide at least temporary solutions 
to national problems touching interstate commerce and often spur 
Congress to fashion enduring legislative solutions pursuant to its 
affirmative commerce power. 
Despite the value of such decisions, the Court has historically 
been reticent to decide cases in the area of state income taxation, 
declaring instead that the appropriate course is to exercise judicial 
restraint and leave such decisions to the political process.11 But the 
Court’s hands-off approach in the realm of the dormant Commerce 
Clause is not as compelled as the Court has represented. In fact, as 
this Comment suggests, traditional rationales supporting judicial 
restraint are inherently weaker in the realm of dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence. Additionally, in light of the well-accepted 
 
 10. See infra Part II.A. 
 11. E.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978) (“It is clear that the 
legislative power granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution would amply 
justify the enactment of legislation requiring all States to adhere to uniform rules for the 
division of income. It is to that body, and not this Court, that the Constitution has committed 
such policy decisions.”); see also Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 
476 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 546–
47 (1950); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 188–89 (1940) (Black, J., 
dissenting); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 449 (1939) (Black, J., 
dissenting); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 327 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting). 
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pattern of Court intervention under the dormant Commerce Clause, 
the Court does not act beyond its powers by appropriately deciding 
state income tax cases involving the uniquely constitutional issues of 
state apportionment and nexus standards. 
Despite calls for judicial deference for fear that such decisions 
will irreversibly deplete the Court’s political capital,12 the theory of 
the dormant Commerce Clause itself ensures that the Court’s 
legitimacy will emerge unscathed after exercise of its dormant 
commerce power. When the Supreme Court renders a decision 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, it is essentially making a 
“remand to Congress.”13 Accordingly, subsequent statutory reversal 
of the Court’s decisions in this arena cannot be perceived as a 
chastising blow from a co-equal branch of government. Rather, 
because the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause decisions are 
provided with the understanding that Congress retains full 
legislative power over issues of interstate commerce, any subsequent 
legislative actions is, in reality, an appropriate response to the 
Court’s “remand.”14 
In this light, statutory reversal of the Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause decisions should have minimal impact on the 
Court’s perceived legitimacy. Therefore, proposals for judicial 
restraint based on the assumption that the Court will theoretically 
lose its legitimacy should yield to the important interest in bringing 
stability and predictability to this muddled area of law. The need for 
the Court’s clarification is especially acute in the area of multi-state 
taxation as business increasingly is conducted electronically and 
across state borders. In this environment, the obsolescence of 
anachronistic nexus standards requiring “physical presence” 
becomes ever more obvious. 
 
 
 12. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 94–95 
(1978) (“The Court’s effectiveness . . . depends substantially on confidence . . . . [T]here is 
a natural quantitative limit to the number of major, principled interventions the Court can 
permit itself . . . . A Court unmindful of this limit will find that more and more of its 
pronouncements are unfulfilled promises, which will ultimately discredit and denude the 
function of constitutional adjudication.”); see also, JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 139, 169 (1980) (speaking of the Court’s public prestige and 
institutional capital). 
 13. See Estreicher, supra note 1, at 389 (referring to the Court’s dormant Commerce 
Clause decisions as a “remand to Congress”). 
 14. Id. 
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Part II of this Comment begins by surveying the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence governing the states’ power to tax, specifically 
outlining the dormant Commerce Clause and its applicability to state 
taxation. Part III then illustrates the current income-tax conundrum, 
points to a solution, and demonstrates why the political process, by 
itself, will continue to fail in implementing any solution to the 
problem. Part IV will then briefly explore the various roles of the 
Supreme Court—especially its role as a catalyst for federal 
congressional action and will cite a few historical examples of the 
Court fulfilling this role. Finally, Part V will briefly conclude by 
advocating judicial review of state corporate income taxation 
schemes pursuant to the Court’s dormant commerce power as a 
catalyst for meaningful legislative reform in the area of state income 
taxation. 
II. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE GOVERNING STATE POWERS OF 
TAXATION 
Most cases dealing with the boundaries of a state’s taxing power 
have arisen under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause. To understand why, it is necessary to take a short 
detour into the history of the Court’s constitutional interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause, and, specifically, the judicially created 
doctrine of the negative or dormant Commerce Clause.15 After a 
general introduction to the doctrine, the dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis applied to state taxation will be explored. 
A. The Dormant Commerce Clause Generally 
Article I Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the 
exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce.16 Accordingly, 
 
 15. As a textual matter, of course, there is no “dormant Commerce Clause” in the 
Constitution; Article I Section 8 contains only an affirmative grant of power to Congress. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. When scholars and courts speak of the dormant Commerce Clause, they 
are referring only to a judicially created doctrine, which interprets Article I’s Commerce Clause 
to grant courts—by negative implication—the power to invalidate state actions that unduly 
burden interstate commerce. See infra Part II.A. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“Congress shall have power . . . to regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.”). The argument implying that Congress’s interstate 
commerce power is exclusive can be traced back to a statement made by Chief Justice John 
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, explaining that “when a State proceeds to regulate commerce . . . 
among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is 
doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.” 22 U.S. 1, 199–200 (1824). 
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federal law preempts state and local law in this area once Congress 
has acted pursuant to its commerce power. But the question remains 
whether the federal judiciary should step in—in the absence of 
congressional legislation—to invalidate state laws because they place 
an undue burden on interstate commerce. The dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine has developed to answer that question in the 
affirmative. 
The Supreme Court has inferred that the Constitution’s 
exclusive grant of commerce power to Congress prohibits, by 
negative implication, regulation of interstate commerce by the states 
themselves.17 And the doctrine permits the Court to review state 
and local laws challenged as unduly hindering interstate commerce 
even where Congress has not yet legislated—in other words, where 
its commerce power essentially lies dormant.18 Simply put, the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine grants federal courts power, in 
the absence of congressional legislation, to leave interstate 
commerce unregulated by striking down state laws that unduly burden 
it.19 The dormant Commerce Clause doctrine exists to diffuse one of 
the framers’ primary concerns addressed in the Constitutional 
Convention; that is, preventing the states from engaging in economic 
protectionism that strained state relations under the Articles of 
Confederation and threatened national unity and stability.20 
Therefore, the Supreme Court routinely strikes down state 
regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause when such 
regulations run counter to the constitutional principle that a state 
must not favor itself at the expense of other states or the nation as a 
whole.21 
 
 17. It is due to this negative implication that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is 
sometimes referred to as the negative commerce clause doctrine. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax 
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995) (“Despite the express grant to 
Congress of the power to ‘regulate Commerce . . . among the several States,’ . . . we have 
consistently held this language to contain a further, negative command, known as the dormant 
Commerce Clause, prohibiting certain state taxation even when Congress has failed to legislate 
on the subject.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)). 
 18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 419 (3d ed. 
2006). 
 19. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 
18 (1937) (“[T]he Commerce Clause, by its own force and without national legislation, puts it 
into the power of the Court to place limits on state authority.”). 
 20. See Wardair Can., Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1986). 
 21. E.g., id.; C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) 
(holding that a local ordinance impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce and 
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B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Applied to State Taxation 
1. The Due Process Clause and Commerce Clause as Jurisdictional 
Limitations on State Taxation 
In general, there are two great jurisdictional limitations on the 
state’s ability to tax: (1) the Due Process Clause, and (2) the 
Commerce Clause. If these limitations are breached by state 
legislation, then the Supreme Court may strike it down. Both the 
Due Process and Commerce clauses impose a “nexus” or minimum 
connection requirement between the taxing state and the entity the 
state seeks to tax.22 However, “[d]espite the similarity in phrasing, 
the nexus requirements of the Due Process and Commerce Clauses 
are not identical.”23 The due process nexus analysis in state tax 
cases is beyond the scope of this Comment, but it largely follows the 
minimum contacts test the Court has advanced to determine 
whether a state court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a civil 
defendant.24 In essence, the Due Process minimum contacts test 
serves as a “proxy for notice” that the defendant will be subject to 
the state’s jurisdiction.25 Notably, the minimum contacts test has 
evolved over time to keep pace with current economic realities in 
which “many commercial transactions touch two or more states.”26 
By jettisoning archaic physical-presence nexus requirements,27 the 
Court’s minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction now elevates 
substance over form by allowing a forum state to exercise personal 
 
thus violated the dormant Commerce Clause when it required that all solid waste processed or 
handled within town be done solely at its own transfer station); Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 
460, 473–74 (2005) (holding that state statutes prohibiting out-of-state wineries from shipping 
wine directly to in-state consumers, but permitting in-state wineries to do so if licensed, violated 
the dormant Commerce Clause); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 
U.S. 564 (1997) (holding that a state’s property tax exemption statute, which singled out 
nonprofit institutions that served mostly state residents for beneficial tax treatment and 
penalized those institutions that did principally interstate business, violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause). 
 22. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 25. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992). 
 26. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957). 
 27. See, for example, the decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), which 
overruled the physical presence requirement for in rem jurisdiction set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff, 
95 U.S. 714 (1877), and held the minimum contacts test to be the governing standard in 
personal jurisdiction analyses. 
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jurisdiction over an entity that merely “purposefully avails itself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state,”28 even 
if the entity does not have a physical presence in the state.29 Thus, a 
business that purposefully avails itself of economic opportunities in 
a given state has notice sufficient for due process that it will be 
subject to that state’s taxing powers. 
In addition to satisfying due process standards, a state tax must 
also satisfy the requirements of the Commerce Clause to be rendered 
constitutional. In Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, the Supreme Court 
held that a state tax is valid under the Commerce Clause only if it 
(1) is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing 
state, (2) is fairly apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided 
by the state.30 The first and fourth prongs combined are a corollary 
of the Due Process’ nexus requirement, but unlike the minimum 
contacts test (which serves a notice function), the first and fourth 
prongs of Complete Auto work together to limit the reach of a state’s 
taxing power to “ensure that state taxation does not unduly burden 
interstate commerce.”31 Because the purposes of the two nexus 
requirements are different, it is possible for a corporation to “have 
the ‘minimum contacts’ with a taxing state as required by the Due 
Process Clause, and yet lack the ‘substantial nexus’ with that State 
as required by the Commerce Clause.”32 For example, while a 
taxpayer clearly may have minimum contacts with a state without 
maintaining a physical presence in the state, in at least some 
instances the Commerce Clause’s “substantial nexus” requirement 
will be satisfied only if the taxpaying entity is physically present in 
the taxing state’s jurisdiction. 
The Court first drew this clear distinction between the Due 
Process and Commerce Clause nexus requirements in Quill Corp. v. 
North Dakota.33 In that case, the Court grappled with the issue of 
 
 28. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
 29. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (“So long as a 
commercial actor’s efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State, we have 
consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal 
jurisdiction there.”). 
 30. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
 31. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 313 (1992). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 314. 
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whether a nonresident mail-order retailer had the duty to collect and 
remit sales taxes on behalf of its North Dakota customers.34 The 
North Dakota law in question imposed a collection duty on any 
vendor that advertised three or more times per year in the state.35 
Although Quill, the mail-order retailer, had no physical presence in 
North Dakota, the company generated a significant amount of 
revenue from North Dakota customers through mail-order catalogs, 
periodical advertising, and telephone calls.36 The Court had no 
problem finding the Due Process Clause’s minimum contacts 
requirement satisfied in this case because Quill had purposefully 
availed itself of the benefits of the taxing jurisdiction.37 But the 
Court ultimately decided that the Commerce Clause’s “substantial 
nexus” requirement was not met. 
Justice Sevens reasoned that imposing a sales tax collection duty 
on Quill would place an undue burden on interstate commerce by 
imposing upon a nonresident corporation the duty to collect taxes 
from customers utilizing the tax rates of a potential pool of over 
6,000 state and local tax jurisdictions.38 Thus, the Court held that 
the state must first establish a substantial nexus with the 
nonresident corporation before it can impose a collection duty upon 
it. This substantial nexus, as Court stated, is demonstrated by the 
corporation’s physical presence in that state.39 In so deciding, the 
Court affirmed its holding in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Deparment of 
Revenue,40 which carved out a bright-line exception for nonresident 
mail-order companies without a physical presence in the taxing 
state’s jurisdiction.41 The Court admitted that a nexus test analyzing 
only physical presence was “artificial at its edges.”42 But the Court 
reasoned that the downsides of artificiality would be offset by the 
clarity of a bright-line rule, the benefits of stare decisis principles, 
 
 34. Id. at 301. 
 35. Id. at 303–04. 
 36. Id. at 302. 
 37. Id. at 308. 
 38. Id. at 313 n.6. 
 39. Id. at 314. 
 40. 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967). 
 41. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 317 (“[A]lthough in [other cases] we have not adopted a 
similar bright-line, physical-presence requirement, our reasoning in those cases does not compel 
that we now reject the rule that Bellas Hess established in the area of sales and use taxes.” 
(alterations in original)). 
 42. Id. at 315. 
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and the need to leave undisturbed the “settled expectations” in the 
sales and use tax realm.43 Importantly, the Court explained that its 
decision was made easier by the fact that “the underlying issue is not 
only one that Congress may be better qualified to resolve, but also 
one that Congress has the ultimate power to resolve[,]” noting that 
“Congress remains free to disagree with our conclusions.”44 Rather 
than overturn its previous decision, the Court found the more 
prudent path to be one of ostensible judicial restraint, finalizing its 
decision with the declaration that “the better part of both wisdom 
and valor is to respect the judgment of the other branches of 
government.”45 
2. Physical Presence or Economic Nexus? 
The current debate surrounding Complete Auto’s four-pronged test 
deals in part with defining the scope of the “substantial nexus” 
prong. Because the Quill Court cabined its physical presence 
requirement to apply only to a state’s sales and use tax jurisdiction, 
the question remains open whether the same physical presence 
requirement should extend to business activity taxes (corporate 
income, franchise, excise, or gross receipts taxes). In the wake of 
Quill, Congress, states, lower courts, and scholars have disagreed on 
the reach of Quill’s physical presence mandate. Some argue that the 
physical presence standard should be applicable to all state taxes,46 
while others argue that a more functional, “economic nexus” 
standard should apply to non-sales and use taxes.47 Of course, the 
arguments on both sides of this debate are informed only by 
normative judgments because after Quill, neither Congress nor the 
Supreme Court, outside of the sales and use tax context, has 
endorsed physical presence or economic nexus as the governing  
 
 43. Id. at 315–16. 
 44. Id. at 318. 
 45. Id. at 319 (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 637 (1981) 
(White, J., concurring)). 
 46. See, e.g., Megan A. Stombock, Economic Nexus and Nonresident Corporate Taxpayers: How 
Far Will It Go?, 61 TAX LAW. 1225, 1242 (2008); Scott D. Smith & Sharlene Amitay, Economic 
Nexus: An Unworkable Standard for Jurisdiction, 25 STATE TAX NOTES 787 (2002). 
 47. See, e.g., Michael T. Fatale, State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical “Physical Presence” 
Constitutional Standard, 54 TAX LAW. 105 (2000); Christina R. Edson, Quill’s Constitutional 
Jurisprudence and Tax Nexus Standards in an Age of Electronic Commerce, 49 TAX LAW. 893, 942–47 
(1995); John A. Swain, State Income Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 373–93 (2003). 
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standard for satisfying the “substantial nexus” prong of Complete 
Auto.48 
Some lower federal and state courts have narrowly construed 
Quill’s holding to apply only to a state’s jurisdiction over sales and 
use taxes, but not to its jurisdiction over state income taxes.49 In 
these cases, the courts are often applying a more comprehensive 
“economic nexus” standard, which is akin to the “minimum 
contacts” test and the “purposeful availment” standard of the Due 
Process nexus analysis.50 The most persuasive arguments for 
denying extension of the physical-presence standard were illustrated 
in a case in which West Virginia’s highest court permitted West 
Virginia to impose corporate and franchise taxes on a nonresident 
corporation with no physical presence in the state because the 
corporation derived economic benefits from sales it made to West 
Virginia customers.51 The court proffered four justifications for 
refusing to extend the physical presence requirement to state 
corporate income taxes: (1) the Quill decision was based on 
principles of stare decisis and not on sound policy; (2) the Quill 
Court itself limited the language of the physical presence standard to 
include only sales and use taxes, rather than applying it universally 
to all state taxes; (3) the compliance burdens imposed by state 
income taxes are far less than for sales and use taxes; and (4) the 
technological innovations and economic realities that emerged since 
Quill have rendered the physical presence standard ineffective and 
obsolete.52 
Conversely, other states and federal courts have determined that 
Quill’s physical presence mandate does extend to state jurisdiction 
over income-based taxes.53 An oft-cited rationale for this approach 
 
 48. See Megan A. Stombock, Economic Nexus and Nonresident Corporate Taxpayers: How Far 
Will it Go?, 61 TAX LAW. 1225, 1227 (2007). 
 49. See, e.g., KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308, 328 (Iowa 2010). 
 50. See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc. v. S. Carolina Tax Comm’n, 437 S.E.2d 13, 18 (S.C. 1993). 
 51. Comm’r v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 640 S.E.2d 226, 235–236 (W. Va. 2006) cert. 
denied, 551 U.S. 1141 (2007). 
 52. Id. at 234 (“[T]he development and proliferation of communication technology . . . 
now makes it possible for an entity to have a significant economic presence in a state absent any 
physical presence there. For this reason . . . the mechanical application of a physical-presence 
standard to franchise and income taxes is a poor measuring stick of an entity’s true nexus with a 
state.”). 
 53. E.g., J.C. Penney Nat’l Bank v. Johnson, 19 S.W.3d 831, 839 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 927 (2000). 
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involves an analysis of comparative burdens between a state’s 
imposition of sales tax collection duties and its direct income tax 
obligations.54 Proponents of a narrow application of Quill argue that 
granting a state sales tax jurisdiction imposes only an administrative 
burden on the nonresident corporation as it merely requires the 
collection and remittance of the customer’s sales tax obligation, 
whereas an income tax, on the other hand, is imposed directly on the 
corporation’s earnings.55 Thus, the argument goes, because the 
imposition of a direct income tax is more onerous than the 
imposition of a mere duty to collect sales taxes imposed upon 
others, the substantial nexus requirements for income taxes should 
be at least as stringent as those imposed for sales tax purposes. 
Additionally, many proponents of the physical presence standard 
gravitate to the justification cited in Quill relating to the value of 
clarity and predictability stemming from a bright-line rule. Because 
actual physical presence is easier to determine than a case-by-case, 
totality-of-the-circumstances economic presence standard, some 
commentators argue that compliance burdens on multi-state 
corporations would be even more burdensome under an economic 
nexus standard.56 
Both sides of the debate marshal compelling arguments in 
support of their position, which likely fuels the wide disparity among 
states in the application of varying nexus standards. But argument 
over which side of the debate is normatively correct misses the 
point: the real problem lies in the state-by-state application of non-
uniform nexus standards. As developing technologies increase the 
prevalence of commerce conducted almost wholly interstate, 
increasing numbers of states are devising new tax schemes to 
capture more of this interstate income. And as corporations devise 
new ways to evade those taxes, the need for an effective uniform 




 54. R. Todd Ervin, Comment, The Taxation of Financial Institutions: Will Physical Presence or 
Economic Presence Win the Day?, 19 VA. TAX REV. 515, 544 (2000) (“[A] sales and use tax is 
nothing more than a collection duty imposed on the taxpayer, whereas a direct income tax is 
actually borne by the taxpayer.”). 
 55. Ryan, supra note 7, at 301. 
 56. WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX 2–4 (2005). 
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3. Problems created by inconsistent application of multiple nexus standards and 
state apportionment formulas 
Apportionment formulae vary widely among the states. Many factors 
contribute to the overall tax burden on a multi-state corporation. 
Thus far, the focus in this Comment has been on the threshold 
determination—the substantial nexus standard—but an equally 
important input into a corporation’s state income tax equation is a 
given state’s apportionment formula. The apportionment formula is 
what states use to determine what portion of a corporation’s global 
revenue is attributable, and therefore taxable, to each state.57 Most 
states have adopted an apportionment formula, which takes a 
weighted average of the individual state’s proportion of three 
inputs—sales, property, and payroll—to come up with an overall 
percentage of a corporation’s global income that is fairly attributable 
to that state.58 So, for example, assuming an equally weighted 
apportionment formula, if a corporation had global sales of $1 
million, $350,000 of which were sales made in State X, the sales 
factor for State X would be 35%.59 The two remaining factors for 
property and payroll are determined in like manner. Finally, the 
weighted average of all three factors would be taken to determine the 
portion of a corporation’s global income a particular state would 
have jurisdiction to tax. 
The Supreme Court has refused to demand a uniform system of 
apportionment by all states, but attempts at creating uniformity have 
been made by the Multistate Tax Commission.60 Nevertheless, 
uniformity has never been achieved, either by consensus or 
legislation, and apportionment formulae currently vary from state to 
state. Many states use a formula that gives double weight to the sales 
factor, but still uses property and payroll as inputs. Other states have 
attempted to capture more corporate revenue by shifting to a single-
sales-factor formula, which, as the name suggests, focuses 
 
 57. Inst. On Tax’n & Econ. Pol’y, Corporate Income Tax Apportionment and the “Single Sales 
Factor”, 8 POL’Y BRIEF 2 (2012), available at http://itepnet.org/pdf/pb11ssf.pdf. 
 58. Id. at 1–2. 
 59. A comprehensive example of the apportionment formula is set forth in Ryan, supra 
note 7, at 280. 
 60. The only restriction the Supreme Court has placed on States’ apportionment formulae 
is that they must (1) be fair, and (2) not discriminate against interstate or foreign commerce. See 
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169–71 (1983). 
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exclusively on the sales factor and disregards property and payroll.61 
The remainder of the states uses a myriad of other apportionment 
formulae that weigh different factors according to how each state 
feels it will achieve maximum revenue generation.62 
a. Nowhere income. Although allowing states the freedom to 
structure their own apportionment formulae may be justified by 
principles of federalism, the nonuniformity of income apportionment 
among the states creates a situation where multi-state corporations 
can be taxed on more—or less—than 100% of their income.63 
Corporations often try to structure their operations so as to leave a 
portion of their income untaxed by any state. When a corporation is 
successful in doing so, the untaxed portion of a corporation’s income 
is often called “nowhere income.”64 To see how a corporation 
achieves nowhere income, consider a hypothetical corporation that 
situates all of its production facilities and employees in State X, but 
makes all of its sales exclusively in State Y. This corporation may 
lobby the State X legislature to require a sales-only apportionment 
formula, while lobbying the State Y legislature, where the 
corporation makes 100% of its sales, to adopt an equally-weighted 
(between property, payroll, and sales) apportionment formula. The 
desired result is that the corporation will not be required to 
apportion any income to State X (and therefore pay no income tax in 
State X) and will be required by State Y to apportion only roughly 
one-third of its income to State Y, thereby creating what the industry 
has termed “nowhere income”—income that is not subject to tax in 
any state—to the tune of roughly two-thirds of its gross income.65 In 
 
 61. Inst. On Tax’n & Econ. Pol’y, Corporate Income Tax Apportionment and the “Single Sales 
Factor”, 8 POL’Y BRIEF 2 (2012), available at http://itepnet.org/pdf/pb11ssf.pdf. As of the writing 
of this Comment, nearly a dozen states have adopted the single-sales-factor apportionment 
formula. 
 62. For a table of the different apportionment formulae applicable in the several states, 
see http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/apport.pdf. 
 63. In Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983), the Supreme 
Court recognized the problem of overlapping taxation, but noted that in practice, eliminating 
this problem would require the Court to establish a single constitutionally mandated method of 
taxation and specific rules regarding application of that method in particular contexts. The Court 
declined to do this, believing that the task was “essentially legislative,” and left it to Congress to 
make this determination. Id. at 171. 
 64. Michael Mazerov, The “Single Sales Factor” Formula for State Corporate Taxes: A Boon to 
Economic Development or a Costly Giveaway?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 24 (rev. 2005), 
available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-27-01sfp.pdf. 
 65. Indeed, the creation of differing tax structures to achieve maximum “nowhere” 
income has been a prominent focus of corporate lobbyists. See Michael Mazerov, Federal “Business 
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sum, “the lack of a uniform method of income apportionment among 
the states produces undesirable ‘gaps and overlaps in the tax bases of 
the various states.’”66 The opportunity for tax evasion creates 
perverse incentives for corporations to divert valuable resources from 
socially productive endeavors—like improving the quality of 
products or the efficiency of production—to lobbyists and other tax 
professionals who can structure corporate operations to take 
advantage of these artificial gaps and overlaps. 
b. Inconsistent and inequitable tax burdens. The nuanced and 
nonuniform system of state corporate income tax schemes among 
the states has created inequitable distribution of tax burdens among 
corporations doing business in any given state. Indeed, many of the 
most profitable nonresident corporations can afford to structure 
their business to comply with the letter of the state tax laws—and 
manage thereby to avoid much of the income tax burden—while still 
exploiting the state’s commercial market. On the other hand, 
smaller, local businesses that operate entirely within a state’s 
borders are unable to take advantage of the tax loopholes available to 
nonresident corporations under the current system. The present 
system is consequently an inefficient tool for revenue generation and 
has attracted wide criticism.67 In addition to the system’s 
inefficiency in collecting revenue for the states, it often 
disadvantages local small businesses and discourages capital 
investment by in-state corporations. 
c. The idealistic solution to the state income tax debacle. As a threshold 
matter, any viable solution to the state income tax debacle requires 
three things: (1) a uniform definition of “Unitary Business” (which 
would bring certainty to taxpayers wishing to know whether they 
must conform to the apportionment and nexus standards), (2) a 
uniform apportionment formula applied by all the states (so as to 
 
Activity Tax Nexus” Legislation: Half of a Two-Pronged Strategy to Gut State Corporate Income Taxes, 
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PROIRITIES 3 (2011), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/1-26-
05sfp.pdf. 
 66. Ryan, supra note 7, at 284 (quoting Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Nuttiness of State and 
Local Taxes—and the Nuttiness of Responses Thereto, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 841, 849 (2002)). 
 67. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 7, at 298 (quoting David Brinori, Stop Taxing Corporate 
Income, 25 ST. TAX NOTES 47, 48 (2002)) (criticizing the current system as “probably the most 
inefficient, least cost-effective revenue source available to the states”); Elliott Dubin, Back to the 
BAT Cave, MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N 7, 7, available at http://www.mtc.gov/uploadedFiles/ 
Multistate_Tax_Commission/Back%20to%20the%20bat%20Cave_HR1439_A%20GSM%20Edit.
pdf. 
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ensure that exactly 100 percent of a corporation’s income is taxed 
proportionately among the several states in which it operates), and 
(3) uniform nexus standards (which would bring certainty to the 
question of whether a corporation is liable to pay tax in any 
particular state). Uniformity on these three fronts is widely accepted 
in the tax community as the optimal solution to the current 
apportionment problem.68 Consensus is lacking, however, on the 
method by which such uniformity should be implemented. In 
general, there seem to be two prevailing methods of implementation: 
(1) multilateral state action, or (2) federal congressional action. 
 (1) Multilateral state action. The proposal for 
multilateral state action is by far the preferred method of achieving 
uniformity on these fronts because it accomplishes the goal of 
uniform taxation without outside intervention by the national 
government. States certainly have the power to act unilaterally to set 
definitions for “unitary business” and to prescribe independent 
apportionment formulae and substantial nexus standards. Since each 
state individually has the power to act unilaterally, it follows that 
states also have the power to act in concert to accomplish the same 
ends on a uniform basis.69 The problem, however, is that states have 
not migrated in the direction of uniformity. In fact, in recent years, 
the divergence in apportionment formulae among states has widely 
increased.70 Additionally, with regard to nexus standards, the states’ 
hands are tied by certain federal legislation71 that imposes 
restrictions on the states’ ability to craft their own uniform nexus 
standard.72 Moreover, when states have moved toward uniformity, it 
has come only in response to the threat of looming federal legislation 
 
 68. See, e.g., Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 J. 
LEGIS. 171, 181–82 (1997) (“[S]cholars have long recognized [the need for uniformity] in state 
and local taxation and, as our economy has expanded and state and local taxes have increased in 
amount and scope, state tax administrators, scholars, and taxpayers have all become increasingly 
sensitive to this need.” (footnotes omitted)); Walter Hellerstein, Federalism in Taxation: The 
Case for Greater Uniformity, 47 NAT’L TAX J. 225, 225 (1994) (Book Review) (“[T]he desirability 
of achieving uniformity in state taxation is one of the rare matters on which state taxpayers, 
state tax administrators, and the adjudicative bodies that resolve their disputes can agree.”). 
 69. Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Difficulty of Getting Serious About State Corporate Tax Reform, 
67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 327, 334–35 (2010). 
 70. Id. at 335. 
 71. Interstate Income Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, § 101, 73 Stat. 555 (1959) 
exempts from creation of nexus some corporations that sell tangible personal property and have 
only certain specified contacts with a given state. 
 72. McClure, supra note 69, at 335. 
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that would impose state uniformity, thereby—in the states’ eyes—
depriving them of their tax sovereignty and potentially decreasing 
their revenue.73 But once the impending legislation lost steam, 
efforts at cohesive uniformity among the various states subsided, 
and most states reverted to their old ways of unilateral action.74 This 
result comes as no surprise given that states generally have no 
incentive to act in concert with other states on these matters because 
differing standards and definitions are valuable as bargaining chips 
to attract investment and to cater to businesses.75 Uniformity would 
even the playing field among the states and would deprive some 
states of a degree of flexibility in ordering their tax scheme as a tool 
for attracting foreign investment and economic growth at the 
expense of other states. Given the inherent incentive against 
uniformity, therefore, it is unlikely that multilateral state action on 
this front will prove an effective method for accomplishing this 
important goal. 
  (2) Federal congressional action. The alternative to 
voluntary uniformity through multilateral state action is federally 
imposed uniformity through federal legislation. In theory, Congress 
could require states to adopt uniform definitions for unitary 
business, uniform nexus standards based on economic presence, and 
uniform apportionment formulae, thereby eliminating tax planning 
strategies and inequitable tax burdens.76 Thoughtful proposals for 
federal legislation of this nature are common.77 Nevertheless, 
however theoretically sound a proposal for Congressional legislation 
may be, it is only valuable if the proposed legislation is actually 
enacted. And as a matter of history, “Congress has not proven to be 
an effective forum for state tax reform.”78 For example, since 1967 
when the physical presence nexus standard was enunciated in Bellas 
 
 73. Id. at 337. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 338. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 78. John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the 
Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 370 (2003). Indeed, at least one empirical academic 
study “predicts that Congress is unlikely ever to enact legislation mandating uniformity in state 
and local taxation.” Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will Congress Intervene?, 23 
J. LEGIS. 171, 173 (1997). This assumes, of course, that there is no external catalyst to propel 
Congress to action. As set forth in the following parts of this Comment, however, the Supreme 
Court may spur Congress to action by a judicial ruling. 
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Hess, federal legislation that would replace this antiquated standard 
with something more akin to economic nexus has been repeatedly 
introduced only to fail.79 Likewise, federal legislation that would 
uniformly establish and expand the physical presence standard, a 
major culprit in the state income tax conundrum, has been 
introduced numerous and consecutive times and met a similar 
demise.80 Congress’s track record on this front has led one 
commentator to note that “[a]s a practical political matter . . . 
Congress cannot be counted on either to take the lead or to lead in 
the right direction.”81 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, neither multilateral 
state action nor federal legislation alone offers tenable solutions. 
Both proposals lack sufficient steam to propel wholesale adoption of 
appropriate uniform standards, which are necessary to effectively 
solve the current morass of state corporate income taxation. This is 
so because both states and corporations have an abiding interest in 
nonuniformity. Corporations oppose uniformity because nonuniform 
standards allow them to shop around among various states and to 
play states against each other for the most favorable tax treatment.82 
States are also opposed to uniformity because it would eliminate one 
of their levers for attracting corporate investment and would mean a 
relinquishment of some degree of states’ taxing sovereignty.83 
Accordingly, the last and probably most effective means of spurring 
uniformity is a Supreme Court ruling on the matter—a ruling with 
which Congress either agrees and thus will end the debate 
conclusively, or one with which Congress disagrees and thus will 




 79. See Swain, supra note 78, at 370. 
 80. See Ryan, supra note 7, at 321 (stating that the Business Activity Tax Simplification 
Act (BATSA), an act which has as one of its primary thrusts the adoption of a physical presence 
nexus standard, has been proposed, in various forms, in every Congress since 2003, but that 
each proposal of the Act died in Congress). 
 81. Swain, supra note 78, at 370. While Congress has adopted a solitary statute dealing 
with the nexus standard in Public Law 86-272, it has only adopted minor legislation that affects 
corporate taxation since then. See Kelley W. Strain, Geoffrey the Giraffe Arrives in Louisiana: Why 
Geoffrey Should Not Pay State Income Tax, 6 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 1, 41 (2006) (quoting Kathleen 
Leslie Roin, Due Process Limits on State Estate Taxation: An Analogy to the State Corporate Income Tax, 
94 YALE L. J. 1229, 1242 n.69 (1985)). 
 82. See McLure, supra note 69, at 338. 
 83. Id. 
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d. A Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
declined petitions to hear a case that would give it the opportunity to 
definitively resolve the substantial nexus standard under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.84 By refusing to hear any cases which 
would require it to articulate an appropriate nexus standard, the 
Court seems to be clinging to the deferential statement it made in 
Quill: that adhering to the antiquated physical presence standard 
enunciated in Bellas Hess is motivated by a desire to defer to 
Congress’s ultimate power over interstate commerce.85 The Court 
surely is wary about contradicting its principled stance of legislative 
deference evidenced by its implied instruction to Congress that, at 
least in the use tax arena, it was “now free to decide whether, when, 
and to what extent the States may burden interstate [businesses],”86 
thus implying that the Court would no longer be meddling in 
decisions regarding substantial nexus standards among the states.87 
However, even though Congress possesses the ultimate power to 
resolve this issue, Congress has historically failed to adopt (and is 
unlikely to ever adopt) any solution largely because of political 
stalemate. In the past, the Supreme Court has not shied away from 
issuing rulings regarding state taxes that burden interstate 
commerce;88 in fact, the Court developed the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine for the express purpose of reviewing state actions 
that negatively impact interstate commerce.89 Given congressional 
stalemate and inability of the states to act in unison to overcome this 
vexing problem, the time is now ripe for the Supreme Court to grant 
certiorari to an appropriate case and to adopt the solution that will 
 
 84. For recent examples involving petitions for clarification of the nexus ambiguity, see 
Lamtec Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 246 P.3d 788 (Wash. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 95 (2011), and 
KFC Corp. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 792 N.W.2d 308 (Iowa 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 97 
(2011)). 
 85. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992). 
 86. Id. 
 87. The Quill decision seems like an odd exit point for the Court considering the volumes 
of case law previously promulgated by the Court, which served to complicate the analysis of 
Complete Auto’s “substantial nexus” prong. It appears that the Court surveyed its collateral 
damage and decided the current state of confusion (inspired in large part by its own decisions) 
would only be exacerbated by further judicial interference and therefore chose the mask of 
legislative deference as an excuse to bow out of the nexus debate rather than risk further 
compounding the confusion. 
 88. See Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959); Boston 
Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977). 
 89. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951). 
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promote equity and efficiency to both taxpaying corporations and 
states in the modern economic environment.90 Still, even if the 
Supreme Court were willing to issue a ruling that would implement 
an appropriate solution, the Court is in a difficult position because it 
must do so within the confines of a specific case or controversy 
whose facts may not be ideal for propounding this solution in its 
entirety. This concern as well as others will be analyzed in the 
following Part, which will defend judicial review under the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine and will support this defense with an 
analysis of the distinctive roles of the Supreme Court—specifically, 
its potential (and less frequently examined) role as a catalyst for 
legislative reform. 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND 
THE CATALYTIC ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
A. A Defense of Judicial Review of State Action Under the Dormant 
Commerce Clause 
Judicial review of state action involving interstate commerce is 
controversial but well established.91 As early as the days of John 
 
 90. Any attempt by the Court to implement a comprehensive policy that solves the state 
income tax conundrum would likely be met with the argument that such policymaking is 
precisely the type of action that should be left entirely to Congress and that would represent an 
overreaching of the Court’s judicial bounds into legislative territory. While it may appear so at 
first blush, it must be recalled that the Court would be acting under the negative commerce 
clause doctrine, so by definition the Court would be acting in the narrow area in which Congress 
has the express authority to effectively “overrule” the Supreme Court’s decision. The Court 
admitted as much in its Quill decision, noting that “[n]o matter how we evaluate the burdens 
that . . . taxes impose on interstate commerce, Congress remains free to disagree with our 
conclusions.” Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992). Consequently, since the 
dormant Commerce Clause arena is one in which it is almost expected that Congress will 
eventually chime in on an important issue dealing with burdens on interstate commerce, any 
future Congressional statute that contradicts the Court-imposed solution to the problem is very 
unlikely to be seen as a lack of Congressional respect for the rulings of the Supreme Court. This 
result obtains in stark contrast to the divergent result that may occur in cases involving judicial 
activism in an arena other than the dormant Commerce Clause where such action by Congress 
could potentially result in the Court’s legitimacy being depreciated. But it is precisely in those 
divergent constitutional cases, unlike the dormant Commerce Clause cases, that the justiciability 
doctrines and other arguments for judicial restraint find their most compelling application. 
Thus, a dormant Commerce Clause decision by the Court is a proper vehicle for at least 
initializing reform in the income tax nexus debate. 
 91. Dormant Commerce Clause opponents dislike the doctrine because it partakes of 
legislative action. Critics sometimes denounce the doctrine on separation of powers grounds, 
arguing that it is wholly for Congress—not the Judiciary—to regulate commerce and to 
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Marshall, the Supreme Court has consistently found that judicial 
invalidation of certain state laws is supported by the Constitution 
and by democratic theory.92 Judicial review of state action currently 
entails a balancing test that first considers whether the state 
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate state end, and then 
balances the burden on and potential discrimination against 
interstate commerce against the state’s interest in enforcing the 
legislation.93 Judicial review under this paradigm is supported by at 
least three important rationales—the first two theoretical and the 
third practical. 
First, judicial review of state legislation is supported by 
democratic theory, which recognizes that state legislatures represent 
only a local constituency. Accordingly, the democratic processes of 
each state will, by their very nature, often favor in-state interests at 
the expense of unrepresented out-of-state interests.94 Because this 
“defect” of localism is an inherent trait of a well-functioning, 
representative state democracy and is not a symptom of breakdown 
in the local democratic process, democratic theory supports judicial 
review of a wide range of even ordinary state legislative measures in 
order to ensure that interstate commerce is not unduly burdened by 
their enactment.95 
Second, judicial review of state action under the dormant 
Commerce Clause is supported by the fact that the Court’s decisions 
 
invalidate state laws that place an undue burden on interstate commerce. See CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 18, at 423. Indeed, Supreme Court Justices themselves have disagreed on the 
propriety of the doctrine. Justice Thomas, for example, has argued that the doctrine authorizes 
the “exercise of judicial power in an area for which there is no textual basis,” and that the Court 
is ill-equipped to engage in the extensive “policy-laden decision making” inherent in 
determinations regarding regulations on interstate commerce. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. 
v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 612, 620 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Despite such 
criticisms, however, the dormant commerce doctrine is well established as a matter of history 
and the propriety of Supreme Court decisions invoking the doctrine is largely uncontested. 
 92. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 408 (1988). 
 93. Id.; see also, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1945); Cities 
Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186–87 (1950). 
 94. TRIBE, supra note 92, at 409 (There are no inherent problems with state actions that 
affect out-of-state interests that have no voice in the state’s democratic process. Speaking 
directly to the issue of judicial review in this context, Tribe asserts that “[w]hatever may be the 
general merit of a system of judicial review which sanctions intervention by the counter-
democratic courts only when the normal processes of democracy have broken down, that model 
is of little use if mechanically applied in the context of interstate commerce, where problems 
often arise precisely because the individual states’ democratic processes have worked well.”). 
 95. Id. at 411. 
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are always subject to subsequent congressional review. Because 
judicial review under the dormant commerce doctrine derives from 
negative implications of the constitutional grant of power to 
Congress, the Court’s limitations on state interference are always 
subject to congressional revision.96 Thus, doctrinal criticisms resting 
upon separation of powers ideals are weak because the dormant 
Commerce Clause is “one of the few areas where Congress has the 
clear authority to overrule a Supreme Court decision interpreting the 
Constitution.”97 And since Congress is free to disagree with the 
Supreme Court and effectively to “overrule” any of its decisions 
rendered in the dormant Commerce Clause realm, any potential 
threat of judicial encroachment on Congress’s lawmaking prerogative 
through the exercise of this doctrine is nonexistent.98 Essentially, in 
the realm of the dormant Commerce Clause, the relationship 
between the Court and Congress is similar to the relationship 
between Congress and the Executive in that the latter branch in both 
relationships has the ability to exercise veto power over the former 
branch’s decisions. Moreover, once a Supreme Court decision has 
been “vetoed” or overwritten by an act of Congress, the Supreme 
Court is powerless to reinstate its prior decision by any means.99 
Consequently, calls for judicial deference based upon the argument 
that the Court’s decision would irrevocably encroach upon the 
territory of Congress are unwarranted because Congress will always 
have the last word in these inter-branch disputes concerning state 
burdens on interstate commerce. 
Finally, judicial review of state actions affecting interstate 
commerce is appropriate because it is the only efficient (and 
arguably the only possible) way to carry out the goal of leaving 
interstate commerce substantially unburdened. Opponents of 
judicial review would instead favor congressional review of state 
 
 96. Id. at 403–04. 
 97. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 449. See also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321 (7th ed. 2004) (“When the Court holds that a state law violates the 
dormant commerce clause, Congress can effectively reverse that ruling by enacting federal 
legislation . . . .”). 
 98. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 97, at 321 (“Court actions invalidating state laws 
[under] negative commerce clause principles are not truly incompatible with the democratic 
process. Rather, such judicial rulings may simply force consideration of multi-state commercial 
problems by Congress.”). 
 99. To continue the analogy, contrast this with Congress’s power to override an 
Executive Veto by a two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress. 
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laws that might burden interstate commerce.100 However, given the 
sheer volume of state legislation and Congress’s limited resource of 
time, such a proposal would be impossible in practice. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that it is unrealistic to expect 
Congress to review every state and local law that may potentially 
unduly burden interstate commerce.101 Thus, in view of the relative 
capacities of the two branches, the judiciary is better suited to the 
task and is not constitutionally prohibited from assuming it. 
Given the rationales discussed above and the longstanding 
history of the dormant Commerce Clause in practice, federal judicial 
review of state action of all kinds is largely undisputed. Moreover, 
judicial review of state taxes under the dormant Commerce Clause is 
especially well established. As discussed in greater detail above in 
Part II.B.1, judicial review of state burdens on interstate commerce is 
governed by Complete Auto’s functional four-part test. Cases involving 
judicial review under this test are legion, and there can be no dispute 
that such review is well established. Thus, the Court should face no 
serious contest in accepting and deciding a case resolving the 
persistent lack of uniformity in the state income tax arena. 
Having thus demonstrated that the Court can exercise its judicial 
powers to decide a state income tax apportionment/nexus case, the 
following section makes the case for why the Court should decide 
such a case based on its distinctive roles in our tripartite system of 
federal government.102 
 
 100. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the 
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569 (1987); Thomas K. Anson & P.M. 
Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEX. L. REV. 71, 
79–85 (1980) (“Congress, not the courts, should decide when to override state regulatory 
initiatives for the sake of the national economy.”). 
 101. See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(“[T]hese restraints are individually too petty, too diversified, and too local to get the attention 
of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters. . . . The sluggishness of government, 
the multitude of matters that clamor for attention, and the relative ease with which men are 
persuaded to postpone troublesome decisions, all make inertia one of the most decisive powers 
in determining the course of our affairs and frequently gives to the established order of things a 
longevity and vitality much beyond its merits.”). 
 102. The following Parts discuss the broader law- and policy-making functions of the 
Supreme Court in order to highlight the normative value of the dialogue that is generated 
between Congress and the Judiciary when each branch acts in its respective constitutional 
sphere. This discussion is intentionally broader than the scope of this article’s treatment of the 
dormant Commerce Clause as applied to state income taxation in order to support this 
Comment’s argument that a Supreme Court ruling on this specific issue is desirable, now that 
the constitutional permissibility of such a decision has been established above. 
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B. The Roles of the Modern Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court wears various hats in its contemporary 
exercise of judicial power. To fully understand the Court’s traditional 
and progressive roles, this Part first will address the theoretical 
underpinnings supporting the prohibition against advisory opinions 
as it provides a framework for thinking about the propriety of 
judicial intervention generally. Second, this Part will survey the 
evolution of the role of the judiciary and discuss its capacity as 
adjudicator, lawmaker, and policymaker. Third, this Part will 
acknowledge the tension between the traditional and progressive 
roles of the Court and explore the Supreme Court’s emerging role as 
a catalyst for legislative reform. Finally, evidence of the Court’s 
catalytic role will be demonstrated through a few brief historical 
examples. 
1. Justifications for the prohibition against advisory opinions applied to 
judicial intervention generally 
Article III Section 2 of the Constitution imposes the “cases and 
controversies” requirement on the Supreme Court, which limits the 
Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicating actual controversies and 
disputes.103 In so doing, this requirement also prohibits the Court 
from offering advisory opinions to either the executive or legislative 
branches. The prohibition against advisory opinions is at the core of 
Article III and restrains the judiciary from advising Congress on the 
constitutionality of legislation before it is passed or from opining on 
other constitutional issues posed to them by the other branches of 
government.104 Three key policy rationales support this prohibition. 
First, the goal of separation of powers is served by “keeping the 
courts out of the legislative process.”105 It is generally accepted that 
it is inappropriate for the judicial branch to opine on what laws 
should be made because this is a purely legislative function; the 
judiciary’s primary function is to adjudicate concrete disputes, not to 
advise Congress in its legislative role. 
 
 103. In Flast v. Cohen, Chief Justice Warren declared that the Constitution’s delineation of 
cases and controversies “define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of 
power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other 
branches of government.” 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). 
 104. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 53, 60. 
 105. Id. at 54. 
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Second, this prohibition conserves judicial resources—especially 
its store of political capital.106 If the Court were permitted to offer 
nonbinding advice that other branches could easily ignore or 
supersede, the vigor and force of Supreme Court rulings would soon 
depreciate. The efficacy of Court rulings depends on the other 
branches’ voluntary compliance with judicial orders, and such 
compliance is conditioned on the Court’s credibility.107 Thus, the 
argument goes, if the Court becomes too loose with its decisions, it 
would deplete its reserve of political capital and the other branches 
could, at some point, refuse to enforce the Court’s orders. The 
prohibition against advisory opinions safeguards the Court’s 
legitimacy by placing spending limits on the Court’s political capital 
and allowing its expenditure only when necessary.108 
While this second policy justification for judicial restraint may be 
theoreticalically valid, historical evidence does not support the 
notion that the Court’s political piggy bank is as fragile as this 
argument assumes. The legitimacy of the Court has been tested 
numerous times with many controversial decisions—some that even 
produce calls for complete judicial reform—and yet the judiciary 
seems to have had ample support to survive these occasional 
storms.109 In practicality, the Court’s legitimacy appears to be 
largely unaffected by each individual Court decision.110 Because 
controversial judicial actions will simultaneously attract support and 
alienate different segments of the population, the Court’s legitimacy 
appears to largely remain unscathed even after controversial policy-
driven decisions. 
In addition to limiting the Court’s jurisdiction to actual 
controversies or disputes, the prohibition against advisory opinions 
requires that there be a “substantial likelihood that a [Supreme 
Court] decision . . . will bring about some change or have some 
effect.”111 In one of its earliest cases, the Court expressed that the 
 
 106. Id. at 51. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. But see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 134–38 (1987) 
(arguing that the Court’s legitimacy is not fragile and that conserving judicial credibility should 
not be a primary objective in constitutional interpretation). 
 109. Gregory A. Caldeira & Kevin T. McGuire, What Americans Know About the Courts and 
Why it Matters, in THE JUDICIAL BRANCH 262, 272–73 (Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 
2005). 
 110. Id. 
 111. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 56. 
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concern underlying this criterion was the violation of the separation 
of powers doctrine. The Court noted that such abstract judicial 
declarations would be inappropriate because they could be “revised 
and controuled [sic] by the legislature, and . . . . [s]uch revision 
and controul we deemed radically inconsistent with the 
independence of that judicial power which is vested in the courts 
. . . .”112 However, this concern for separation of powers does not 
inhere in decisions rendered by the Court in the dormant Commerce 
Clause realm because the Court is understood to be filling a gap left 
by Congress’s failure to exercise its commerce power. In this way, 
the Court acts as an appropriate stop-gap until Congress directly 
reviews the issue. Thus, any later revision of the Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause decision is not viewed as a violation of the 
judiciary’s independence, but as an appropriate exercise of 
Congress’s commerce power. Hence, the dormant Commerce Clause 
is unique because it allows both federal branches—Congress and the 
Supreme Court—to act in ways that would otherwise be seen as an 
encroachment on each other’s separate and independent functions. 
Finally, the third justification for the prohibition against advisory 
opinions is that it improves judicial decision making by limiting the 
Court’s rulings to concrete controversies best suited to judicial 
resolution.113 While the Court plainly must rule on an actual 
dispute, its dormant commerce decisions should not be discredited 
for their abstract nature. The value of precision in dormant 
commerce decisions is not as high as it is in other contexts since 
Congress is free to alter or even abolish the Court’s ruling. Because 
of this unique characteristic of dormant commerce decisions, their 
highest value is not always in their ability to resolve the particular 
case in question; rather, it is sometimes in the value of their 
statement to the coordinate branches of government. 
 
 
 112. Heyburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Call.) 409, 411 (1792). 
 113. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 54; see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96–97 (1968) 
(noting that the prohibition against advisory opinions “recognizes that such suits often are not 
pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided when a question emerges 
precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every 
aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests” (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
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A. The Supreme Court as Adjudicator, Lawmaker, and Policymaker 
The Supreme Court is both a lawmaking and policy-setting 
institution.114 Rather than merely proclaiming what the law is, the 
modern Supreme Court participates in policymaking decisions that 
are largely informed by public opinion.115 In this way, the modern 
Court partakes of a “legislative” nature by making law. This is not to 
say that the Supreme Court does or should legislate in the traditional 
sense; the Constitutional limits of Article III, of course, still apply. 
But acknowledging the dual role of the modern Supreme Court gives 
place for a view of the Court as a contributor in the policymaking 
Congressional discussion—particularly in decisions involving the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
1. Supreme Court as adjudicator 
The traditional and least controversial role of the Supreme Court 
is that of adjudicator. Many framers of the Constitution considered 
the Court’s role in the governmental process to be quite limited. 
Indeed, Alexander Hamilton insisted that the judicial branch would 
be the least dangerous of the three because it would exercise “no 
influence over either the sword or the purse,” but would have the 
capacity only to render judgments.116 Under this narrow view, the 
Court was to resolve disputes by discovering and applying law that 
existed independent of judicial judgment. Accordingly, any true 
lawmaking and policymaking were left within the express purview of 
Congress. In accordance with this perception, the framers attempted 
to insulate the federal judiciary from popular whim by requiring 
 
 114. See Scott H. Bice, The Limited Grant of Certiorari and the Justification of Judicial Review, 
1975 WIS. L. REV. 343, 379 (noting that the Supreme Court is an “essential policymaking 
institution”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian 
Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1158–61 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme 
Court is a “policy maker” while acknowledging the ways in which its policymaking differs from 
that of the overtly political branches); Katherine C. Naff, From Bakke to Grutter and Gratz: The 
Supreme Court as a Policymaking Institution, 21 REV. OF POL’Y RES. 405, 424 (2004). 
 115. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Supreme Court as Constitutional Interpreter: Chronology 
Without History, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1384, 1388 (1992) (“While the Supreme Court is, quite 
simply, a political institution, it would have us believe that this is not so; most of the time the 
Court maintains that it is simply engaged in faithful adherence to rules and decisions previously 
laid down.”); MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 191–92 (1988) (discussing possible political motives behind legal doctrine in support of the 
argument that the Supreme Court is political to its core). 
 116. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/27/2014 10:28 AM 
1021 Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause 
 1049 
judicial appointments to be made by executive nominations and 
confirmed by the Senate (whose members were selected by the state 
legislators, not by popular vote as they are today) and also by 
granting life tenure of federal judges, which could be cut short only 
upon bad behavior.117 
Over time, however, the perception that the exercise of the 
Court’s adjudicative function merely involved the recognition and 
application of common law and positive law has largely been 
abandoned.118 As one commentator noted, “American courts, both 
federal and state, do not simply ‘announce’ the law; as much as any 
other set of institutions, they make policy.”119 This realist shift in 
scholarly perception of the Court has emerged by observation that 
general laws do not always resolve specific legal questions. In those 
instances, judges must fill the gap by making law.120 Additionally, 
cases often arise in which judges determine that existing legal rules 
are inadequate to serve justice or overarching societal values.121 In 
such cases, judges must make value judgments and engage in 
policymaking—a role traditionally thought of as purely legislative.122 
Despite Hamilton’s narrow conception of the Court’s role, the 
modern judiciary now appears to be significantly involved in creating 
and implementing public policy.123 
Moreover, as the nation’s political structure has progressed, the 
judiciary has become more democratized and concomitantly more 
informed by public opinion.124 For example, televised Senate 
 
 117. Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 263. One reason for life tenure was to 
“enhance the likelihood that [justices’] decisions [would] be based on the merits of the case and 
not on political pressure.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 3. 
 118. See EDWARD F. HENNESSEY, JUDGES MAKING LAW 1 (1994) (“The proposition that 
judges merely find the law that was always there is a fiction.”); see also Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 417 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of 
lawmaking, inheres in most . . . judicial action.”) (emphasis in original). 
 119. Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire, Introduction to THE JUDICIAL BRANCH, xxi, xxii 
(Kermit L. Hall & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 2005). 
 120. HENNESSEY, supra note 118. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Hall & McGuire, supra note 119. 
 124. See, e.g., William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a 
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 87, 90, 96 (1993) (concluding that public opinion and Supreme Court decisions 
influence each other in an iterative process); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 257, 322–25 (2005) (compiling and discussing the research surrounding the 
interplay between judicial decisions and public opinion). 
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Judiciary Committee hearings are followed closely by members of the 
media intending to mobilize mass opinion to influence nomination 
decisions.125 Federal courts also continue to find themselves 
enmeshed in provocative policy issues.126 Engaging in such salient 
policy issues forces the Court to be conscious of public values that 
often find expression in judicial decisions127—and rightfully so. 
Because government derives its “just powers from the consent of the 
governed, the authority of American courts is conditioned by popular 
opinion.”128 Although it is argued that the Court should be 
sequestered from public opinion in order to insulate it from political 
pressure, public opinion itself serves as a check on potential excesses 
by the Court.129 Since the Court relies on the political branches to 
carry out its orders, “it cannot afford to alienate the average 
American for very long. Without a basic undercurrent of support for 
their actions, the justices cannot expect that their decisions will be 
taken seriously by elected officials who, in the end, are the ones who 
must translate the Court’s rulings into action.”130 As a result, the 
judiciary, just like Congress, is informed by public opinion and 
arguably guided thereby.131 
The modern judicial and legislative processes also exhibit similar 
features in two additional and important ways. First, judicial 
decisions and federally enacted statutes both govern the behavior of 
the population at large. Congressional legislation is directed toward 
the entire population, or at least those who fall within the ambit of 
the statute, and imposes an obligation on those citizens.132 
Similarly, although the Court’s rulings theoretically apply only to the 
litigants before the Court, the precedent set by the Court creates 
 
 125. Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 263. 
 126. The Supreme Court “has become actively engaged in, among other things, the 
regulation of abortion, the development of police procedures, the congressional oversight of the 
federal bureaucracy, and even the determination of the 2000 presidential election.” Hall & 
McGuire, supra note 119, at xxi. 
 127. See Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 263. 
 128. Id. at 272 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 129. Id. at 270. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., DAVID G. BARNUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 287–99 
(1993) (studying the trend line of public opinion across multiple salient political issues; 
comparing them to Supreme Court decisions; and concluding that the decisions closely followed 
the public opinion trend line in each area). 
 132. Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 82, 87–88 (David F. Forte ed., 1972). 
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obligations that must be followed by all similarly situated 
individuals.133 
Second, the Court imitates the legislative process through the 
practice of accepting amicus curiae briefs that bear a strong 
resemblance—and have an effect similar to—congressional lobbying 
efforts. For example, some amicus curiae briefs are not submitted by 
parties with similar or identical interests to those presently before 
the Court.134 Instead, the focus of some briefs has been on the “size 
and importance of the group represented[] or on contemporaneous 
press comment adverse to the ruling of the Court.”135 In effect, 
these briefs essentially become an “instrumentality designed to exert 
extrajudicial pressure on judicial decisions.”136 In some respects, 
amicus curiae briefs have developed into the equivalent of 
congressional lobbyists and have become the vehicle for propaganda 
efforts.137 Indeed, many of the voices speaking on policy matters in 
the houses of Congress are the same voices heard in the Supreme 
Court halls through amicus briefs attached to Supreme Court cases 
involving similar issues.138 
In sum, the modern Court and Congress exhibit many similar 
characteristics in that they are both (1) influenced by public opinion, 
(2) engaged in frequent policymaking decisions that impact wide 
swaths of the population, and (3) instructed and persuaded by 
lobbyists in forming those decisions. As such, it is widely accepted 
that the role of the judiciary partakes of a policymaking function. But 
it is similarly accepted that the Court is constrained by the 
constitutional limits on judicial power. Because of these competing 
tensions and the practical similarities between modern judicial and 
legislative functions, another permissive view of the Supreme Court 




 133. Id. at 87. 
 134. Id. at 88. 
 135. Id. (citations omitted). 
 136. Id. (citations omitted). 
 137. Id. at 88–89. 
 138. A good example of this is the KFC case’s amicus briefs. Several of those institutions 
regularly speak on those issues in congressional hearings. 
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B. The Supreme Court as Catalyst for Legislative Inertia 
The similarities between Congress and the Court demonstrate 
that the Supreme Court can be an active, though limited, player in 
the legislative process. Specifically, the Court is in the unique 
position to spur legislative dialogue because it is the only other 
branch with constitutional authority to make law.139 Moreover, the 
need for judicial intervention is especially weighty when both 
branches’ areas of expertise extensively overlap, as they do when a 
controversy resides at the intersection of Congress’s commerce 
power and the Supreme Court’s negative commerce clause 
jurisprudence. Once the Court hands down a decision utilizing the 
negative Commerce Clause doctrine, that decision remains 
governing law until Congress chooses to change it.140 Often, 
Congress lacks sufficient incentive to push legislation through the 
political process unless and until the Supreme Court intervenes. But 
once the Court rules, Congress often feels reactionary pressure from 
its constituents, and the ruling becomes part of the political 
dialogue. By handing down a decision, then, the Court catalyzes 
legislative gridlock. As a catalyst, the Supreme Court may be viewed 
in one of two roles: Opinion Leader or Discourse Framer. 
1. The Supreme Court as Opinion Leader 
Some argue that the Supreme Court, because of its prominence 
and public visibility, can act as a catalyst for policy reform by ruling 
in ways that actually shape the public’s opinion on issues.141 This 
argument, however, appears to be unsupported by empirical 
evidence.142 Rather, evidence seems to suggest that the public reacts 
to court rulings according to their preexisting opinions on the policy 
 
 139. Although executive agencies create law through their rulemaking and adjudicatory 
processes, the Constitution does not discuss this aspect of the modern administrative state. 
 140. Whether similar intervention by the Court would be permissible in other contexts 
will not be discussed here. Although examples of the Court’s ability to spur legislation outside 
of the dormant Commerce Clause context will be given below, the purpose of this Comment is 
to demonstrate that Court intervention under its dormant commerce power is constitutionally 
permissible and in some cases normatively desirable. 
 141. Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 274 (“Some have argued that . . . the U.S. 
Supreme Court can act as an opinion leader by crafting policies that will instruct and persuade 
the mass public.”). 
 142. See id. 
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issue, instead of in accordance with the Court’s handling of them.143 
If anything, the Court’s rulings often serve to galvanize previously 
held opinions on the issue rather than to sway public opinion in a 
particular direction.144 Public support for abortion, for example, 
before and after Roe v. Wade145 evidenced little, if any change.146 The 
Court’s ruling did, however, seem to intensify both preexisting 
support and opposition of abortion.147 This suggests that Supreme 
Court rulings in salient political issues tend to polarize, instead of 
change, the direction of political debate.148 Although the evidence 
does not support the conclusion that the Court does, in fact, act as 
an opinion leader, the observed crystallizing and intensifying effect 
of these decisions on existing public opinion seems to indicate that 
the Court’s decisions can act as a catalyst in potentially fomenting 
enough legislative fervor to spur otherwise latent congressional 
action. 
2. The Supreme Court as Debate Framer 
Even if the Court empirically does not have the ability to actually 
modify existing public opinion on certain issues, it may still have the 
power to shape the public debate about those issues. As one 
commentator noted, certain courts’ “adoption of specific policies in 
the cases that they do decide often provide the specific terms for 
popular debate.”149 The true benefit of the Supreme Court’s decision 
(in assessing its role as catalyst or debate framer) may not always be 
the substance of the ruling the Court hands down, but rather the 
public debate that the decision spurs at the federal congressional 
level. Indeed, Justice Ginsburg once explained that the driving 
purpose of her dissent in a particular case was to “attract immediate 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 275 (“[T]he justices’ policies [often] have a polarizing, rather than a persuasive 
effect. Instead of producing attitude change, the Court can serve to crystallize the public’s 
existing attitudes, increasing their intensity.”). 
 145. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 146. Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 275. 
 147. See Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme 
Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 759 (1989). 
 148. Similar effects were seen after prominent Court decisions on capital punishment. Id.; 
see also Timothy R. Johnson & Andrew D. Martin, The Public’s Conditional Response to Supreme 
Court Decisions, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 299, 299–309 (1998). 
 149. Caldeira & McGuire, supra note 109, at 274. 
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public attention and to propel legislative change.”150 She then went 
on to demonstrate how her purpose was achieved, noting that 
Congress “responded [favorably] within days after the Court’s 
decision issued.”151 Of course, in most cases, the best decisions in 
complex social and economic issues are in fact reached in the 
congressional halls rather than the Justices’ chambers, but judicial 
decisions can kindle the legislative flame of debate and can frame the 
debate in a way that ultimately results in the most beneficial and 
efficient congressional action. 
A few historical examples will illustrate the Court’s ability to 
issue rulings that prompt reactionary legislation. At times 
reactionary legislative discussion may not always be framed correctly 
or result in an agreed-upon normative result. Indeed, in at least the 
federal takings example that follows, it is clear that the reactionary 
legislation misconstrued the Court’s holding, so the “framing” value 
of the Court’s decision was lost altogether. But the following 
examples illustrate the fact that the Supreme Court’s decisions 
catalyze public and legislative debate about important issues, and 
this fact provides a basis for this Comment’s argument that the 
Court should intervene to catalyze such debate and generate a final 
resolution to the present patchwork of inconsistent standards within 
the state income tax realm. 
a. Eminent Domain. In 2005, the Court decided the case of Kelo v. 
City of New London152 in which it held that distressed city 
governments can condemn private land in order to facilitate area-
wide, integrated redevelopment projects.153 The case was received by 
the public with widespread criticism because the private property, 
once condemned, was given to a private developer for purposes of 
eliminating the blighted areas of the city and effectuating a 
wholesale redevelopment of the city.154 Many objected to this ruling 
on the basis that it seemed to grant governments the power to 
condemn private property and transfer it to another private entity 
 
 150. Orin Kerr, Justice Ginsburg and Legislative Independence, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 25, 
2007, 12:13 AM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/1193284491.shtml. 
 151. Id. 
 152. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 153. Id. at 474–75. 
 154. Id. at 473. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1423–26 (2006) for a discussion of criticism in the wake of the Kelo 
decision. 
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despite the general rule that governmental takings be done for 
“public use,” as long as doing so would provide incidental public 
benefits.155 Although this was not the holding of the case,156 the 
media and the public latched onto this interpretation and the debate 
stimulated various federal and state legislative efforts to curb this 
perceived error. These efforts resulted in the initiation of at least 
three bills,157 each with different proposals to limit governmental 
takings, including one effort at a constitutional amendment.158 The 
legislative aftermath of Kelo illustrates the power of Supreme Court 
decisions to instigate public and Congressional awareness of 
important constitutional issues and to spur Congress to action. Had 
the Court refused to hear the Kelo case, it is unlikely that this narrow 
issue would have been thrust to the forefront of congressional 
consciousness in a way that would generate almost immediate 
legislative action. 
b. Free Exercise Clause. In 1990, the Supreme Court passed 
judgment on the case of Employment Division, Department of Human 
Resources of Oregon v. Smith.159 In that case, an Oregon law prohibited 
the use of peyote, a hallucinogenic commonly ingested as part of 
Respondents’ Native American religious rituals.160 The Respondents 
were discharged from their employment and denied unemployment 
benefits for coming to work intoxicated. Afterward, Respondents 
challenged the law under the Free Exercise Clause claiming that it 
infringed their ability to freely exercise their religion. The Supreme 
Court rejected this challenge and held that facially neutral, generally 
applicable laws that incidentally burden religious practice are not 
subject to Free Exercise challenges.161 This decision upended 
previous Supreme Court precedent, which provided that 
governmental actions burdening religion must pass a form of strict 
scrutiny to survive.162 
 
 
 155. John R. Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, Fallout from Kelo: Ruling Spurs Legislative Proposals 
to Limit Takings, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19, 2005, at A5. 
 156. See id. 
 157. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. § 1A (2005); H.R.J. 
Res. 60, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 158. H.R.J. Res. 60, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 159. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 160. Id. at 874. 
 161. Id. at 889. 
 162. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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In direct response to the Court’s decision in Smith, Congress 
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act163 (RFRA) to 
override Smith and restore the strict scrutiny test that existed prior 
to the Smith decision.164 RFRA directly contradicted the Court’s 
holding in Smith and would have required the Supreme Court to 
apply strict scrutiny when considering all free exercise challenges—
even those dealing with neutral laws of general applicability.165 
Congress claimed authority to enact RFRA under section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment which allows congress to “enforce, by 
appropriate legislation,” the substantive guarantees of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.166 As a counter-response to RFRA, the 
Supreme Court declared the legislation unconstitutional as applied 
to the states because the statute had effectively rewritten, rather 
than merely enforced, the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment 
as interpreted by the Court in Smith.167 This back-and-forth dialogue 
between the Supreme Court and Congress further demonstrates the 
power of Court decisions to drive issues to the forefront of 
congressional debate and subsequently spur a legislative response. 
Although RFRA was struck down for attempting to invade the 
Court’s prerogative to declare what the law is, no such separation of 
powers problem would arise in a Court decision defining substantial 
nexus requirements for income tax purposes.168 When the Court 
decides cases pursuant to its dormant commerce power, such 
decisions are subject to constitutionally-sanctioned wholesale change 
by Congress as it deems appropriate.169 
c. Business activity tax nexus. The most relevant example in this 
section comes from a Court case and legislative response in the 
business activity tax nexus arena. This example is especially 
instructive in the present analysis because it falls squarely within the 
dormant Commerce Clause realm and illustrates perfectly the 
Court’s power to elicit legislative response. 
 
 
 163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
 164. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 18, at 296. 
 165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (2006). 
 166. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 167. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
 168. For support of the Court’s prerogative, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) 
(“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 169. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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In February 1959, the Supreme Court decided the case of 
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota170 in which it held 
that an out-of-state corporation may establish a substantial nexus for 
income tax purposes if it uses employees to solicit orders within that 
state’s boundaries.171 The Court in broad and unspecific language 
declared that the determination of sufficient nexus must turn on the 
“controlling question of whether the state has given anything for 
which it can ask return.”172 The Court’s ethereal language created 
concerns for both businesses and Congress.173 Most problematic was 
the Court’s failure to provide guidance as to the nature and quantity 
of contacts that would be sufficient to generate nexus.174 This 
created a terrible lack of predictability for businesses engaging in 
interstate commerce and invited the states to broadly define nexus, 
as states arguably would need to give very little in order to be able to 
ask for at least some return. 
Congress immediately became concerned with the potential 
burdens the Court’s ruling could have on interstate commerce—both 
because of uncertainty to businesses and the wide latitude states 
would have to tax interstate commerce—and responded with 
astonishing speed to enact Public Law 86-272 as a stop-gap 
solution.175 The purpose of this law was to grant greater certainty to 
businesses and states by more narrowly defining the boundaries of 
the nexus analysis. In essence, Public Law 86-272 prevents out-of-
state vendors from generating nexus with a state if those venders 
only engage in solicitation activities within a market state. This 
legislation was intended to be a temporary legislative fix while a 
more complete statutory solution could be devised.176 However, 
over  
 
 170. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). 
 171. Id. at 452. 
 172. Id. at 465 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940)). 
 173. See Annette Nellen, The 50th Anniversary of Public Law. 86–272, CPA2BIZ.COM (Mar. 
27, 2008), http://www.cpa2biz.com/Content/media/PRODUCER_CONTENT/Newsletters/ 
Articles2008/Corp Tax/Public_Law032708.jsp. 
 174. See id. 
 175. Act of Sep. 14 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 381–
391 (2006)). Public Law 86-272 was passed within seven months of the Court’s decision in 
Northwestern States Portland Cement. See Nellen, supra note 173. 
 176. Public Law 86-272 prohibits a state from imposing an income tax on out-of-state 
corporations whose only contacts with a state amount to solicitation of orders for tangible 
personal property from customers within the market state. 
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half a century later, no further congressional guidance on nexus 
requirements has been offered, and none appears to be forthcoming. 
Congress’s immediate reaction to the Court’s dormant 
commerce ruling provides an excellent example of the Court’s 
catalytic role in propelling Congress to action on state income tax 
issues. Of course, the Court’s decision could be criticized for its lack 
of clarity, but it appears to have been this very lack of clarity that 
engendered enough congressional concern to pass legislation to 
correct the perceived ambiguity.177 As explained in Part II, Congress 
is unlikely to enact a statute requiring uniformity in the companion 
area of state income taxation without a similar external catalyst. The 
opportunity is now ripe for the Court to once again step in to either 
solve the problem or give Congress a reason to intervene. At a 
minimum, a Court decision would provide a measure of 
predictability to states and taxpayers until Congress, under its 
commerce power, affirmatively legislates on the matter. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Inconsistency, unpredictability, inequity, and confusion have 
abounded for decades in the area of state corporate income taxation 
due to the lack of uniformity in application of state income tax 
principles among the states. Effective legislative proposals have been 
offered, but due to the misaligned incentives of businesses and 
states, congressional legislation adopting these proposals has 
repeatedly failed and is likely to continue failing absent some 
external catalyst. Over two decades ago, the Supreme Court issued 
what appeared to be its final ruling in the area of state income tax 
nexus requirements by overtly deferring to Congress for further 
guidance. Since that time numerous petitions have come before the 
Court seeking constitutional guidance in this area, but the Court has 
refused to hear them out of ostensible respect for the separation of 
 
 177. Certainly, the Court should not issue unclear or ambiguous dormant Commerce 
Clause rulings simply to evoke a response from the legislature. I am simply pointing out that by 
their very nature, judicial opinions will never be as complete and comprehensive as full-scale 
legislation because the court is limited to the scope of the particular case or controversy before 
it. Additionally, the court is often unequipped to answer important policy aspects surrounding 
larger issues of interstate commerce. Consequently, dormant Commerce Clause decisions will 
most likely leave gaps to be filled or issues to be clarified by Congress. But an important value of 
these rulings, clear or not, is their power to draw congressional attention to issues that perhaps 
would otherwise be lost to legislative inertia. 
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powers doctrine. 
However, constitutional doctrines advocating strict separation of 
powers do not apply with the same force in the dormant Commerce 
Clause realm. This narrow area of constitutional law grants the 
Court permission to rule on issues traditionally left to Congress 
because it is one of the few areas where Congress has the express 
power to overrule the Court’s decisions. Furthermore, as a 
functional matter, the modern Court and Congress are both involved 
in policymaking. Thus, the Court can and should act as a catalyst and 
debate framer for Congress on the important issue of state income 
tax nexus and apportionment requirements in order to impose 
much-needed uniformity in this muddled area of law. Just as it did in 
the sales-tax nexus debate over a half-century ago, such a course will 
likely overcome legislative gridlock and incentivize Congress to make 
appropriate modifications as it sees fit. In so doing, the Court will 
appropriately fulfill one of its modern roles as catalyst for legislative 
reform. 
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